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ABSTRACT 
 
A branch of the literature in international finance has tried to give a definitive answer to the 
question, who is better informed in an emerging market, Foreigners or Locals?. We measured the 
probability of informed trading (PIN) for the Jakarta Stock Exchange for two types of investors, 
foreigners and locals, developing an extension of the model of Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997). 
We find that locals do most of the informed trades, but also most of the uninformed trades. On the 
other hand, given the type of investor, foreigners are more likely to be informed than locals.  
Besides, the evidence shows that locals tend to be more informed in smaller and more volatile 
firms, whereas foreigners tend to be more informed in larger an less volatile firms and firms with 
higher foreign ownership. We also find evidence of market-wide effects on liquidity from the 
foreign informed trades but not from the local ones. 
 
 
Introduction  
 
More than 15 years have passed since most emerging markets undertook liberalization 
processes, allowing a surge of international portfolio flows. The liberalization process itself has 
been hailed mostly as beneficial, in terms of reduced cost-of-capital, improved information 
environment and positive economic effects. However, the role of foreign investors in emerging 
markets is still not well understood. It is not clear if they act most of the time as sophisticated 
investors keen on selecting undervalued firms or if, on the contrary, they increase the pool of 
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noise traders in a market.  Assuming that they are informed, it is unclear whether they compete 
directly with local informed traders or, instead, they bring fresh information to the market.   
Whether foreign investors are better or less informed than locals is still a hotly debated issue 
in the international finance literature. People seem to have strong beliefs about it, hardly 
surprising since sensible arguments can be offered to support either point. Theoretical models in 
the ‘Home bias’ literature including Gehring(1993), Brennan and Cao(1997) and Griffin, Nardari 
and Stulz(2004) assume that local investors are better informed than foreign investors. The 
empirical tests of ‘Home bias’ have been strongly supportive of this claim, (see Edison and 
Warnock (2004) and Kang and Stulz (1997)). The rationale is that locals have an edge in terms of 
language, culture and networks that enable them to get better private information than foreigners. 
This ‘Home advantage’ effect should be stronger in the emerging markets because of lower 
standards of  corporate governance, public scrutiny and information transparency as suggested by 
Johnson et al (2000), Klapper and Love(2002), and reduced macro transparency (Gaston-Gelos 
and Wei(2002)). Moreover, since most emerging countries do not enforce laws against insider 
trading (Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)), it is very likely that inside information is actively 
exploited by local groups with ties to the firms’ management.  
Others argue exactly the opposite. Foreign flows tend to be driven by experienced and 
sophisticated institutional investors unlike the typical local investors as shown by Grinblatt and 
Keloharju(2000) for Finland and Barber et al (2005) for Taiwan. The institutional investor 
literature, (see Bartov et al(2000), Dennis and Weston (2001)),  provides evidence that institutions 
are better informed than individual investors. Taking together those two facts, the advocates of 
this position argue that foreign investors are better informed than locals. As the title of Richards 
(2005) study foreign investors in emerging markets represent ‘big fish’ in small ponds. 
Seasholes(2004) and Grinblatt and Keloharju(2000) argue that foreign institutions have the 
expertise, technology, and resources to make better inferences on expected returns and earnings 
based on publicly available information, particularly on equities of larger and more publicly 
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recognized. Foreign institutions can always set up local offices and hire local personnel to 
overcome cultural barriers.  Huang and Shiu (2005) find that locals are more likely to trade for 
non-informational reasons than foreigners.  
In this paper, we estimate directly the proportion of informed traders from both groups of 
investors: foreigners and locals in Indonesia, for the period April 2004 - March 2006. We 
estimate separately the probability of informed trading (PIN) of Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) 
for the two groups locals and foreigners: PINL and PINF respectively. Both variables are estimated 
on a stock-month basis from daily summary information on the trades.  Our main result is that 
PINL is significantly larger than PINF for both the overall market and most of the individual 
stocks, across the different deciles of size. This means that locals are responsible for most of the 
informed trades, as the ‘Home advantage’ side poses. Moreover, locals represent more trades, 
both informed and uninformed than foreigners. Interestingly, if you compute the probability of 
being informed given the type of investor, then a foreigner is more likely to be informed than a 
local. This is consistent with the idea of the average foreign investor being more sophisticated 
than the average local, as argued by the ‘Big fish’ supporters. This result holds not only for the 
overall market but also for each size decile. As a robustness check, we also estimated the PINs 
base on  daily trades computed directly from transaction data for the period April 2005 to July 
2005, finding the same results. 
Thus, if the research question is which group collectively brings the most informed trades to 
the market then the answer is the local. However, if the research question is: who is more likely to 
be informed?,  the answer is the foreigner. To our knowledge, no paper has measured directly the 
probability of informed trading of each group, neither has any paper distinguished between these 
two research questions, as we do in this paper 
The extant empirical literature to the question of who is better informed, foreigners or locals, 
has been mixed or inconclusive. Overall, the answers vary with the methodology and the 
particular dataset used. For example, using a database of 44 countries, Froot, O’Connell and 
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Seasholes (2001) reported that the flows toward emerging markets present positive feedback 
trading and have positive forecast power for future equity returns. However, the authors recognize 
that the predictability of future returns can be explained as foreign flows being informed, or 
alternatively, as caused by price pressure and persistence of foreign flows combined with 
persistence of flows. Using Korean transaction data, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2005) show that 
foreign investors trade at a disadvantage when compared with local investors and indeed have a 
higher price impact1. However, they argue that the evidence is consistent with momentum-trading 
by foreigners rather than with foreign investors being better informed, since the price impact is 
not permanent.   
Several studies have found support for the ‘big fish’ side. Using daily data on Taiwan, 
Seasholes (2004) presents three measures suggesting that foreign investors outperform locals, 
particularly when investing in larger firms and firms with low leverage. His stronger finding is 
that foreign investors tend to buy more than locals before positive earnings surprises and sell 
more before negative earning surprises. Thus, the evidence of his paper is suggestive that in 
Taiwan, the proportion of informed traders in larger in the foreign group of investors than in the 
local one, but it doesn’t rule out that locals can be still doing most of the informed trades of the 
market as a whole. Other papers that have provided evidence consistent with the ‘big fish’ 
argument include: Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), using a very detailed database in the Finish 
market; Froot and Ramadorai (2001), showing that cross-border inflows into foreign countries 
positively forecast changes in the prices of country close-end funds; and Huang and Shiu (2005) 
and Barber et al (2005), both showing that in Taiwan foreigners have a superior short-term 
investment performance. 
On the contrary, in support of the ‘Home advantage’ hypothesis, Hau (2001) shows that 
foreign traders have an inferior performance than local traders in Germany. Kim and Wei (2002) 
present evidence that foreigners were less informed than locals in Korea in the context of the 
                                                 
1 Richards(2005) show the same effect using market wide daily data in 5 emerging markets.  
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1997 currency crisis. Kaufman, Mehrez and Schmuckler (2005) found that local managers in 
Russia, Thailand and Korea anticipated the financial crises in their respective countries, but not in 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Bhattacharya et al (2004) report that returns on Mexican class ‘A’ shares 
(restricted to foreigners) predict returns on class ‘B’ shares (unrestricted). 
As in this paper, Dvorak (2005) also investigates the case of Indonesia. His approach consists 
in separately estimating the returns for the transactions of the two groups, foreigners and locals at 
different investment periods based on daily buys and sells at firm-level, for the 30 most liquid 
stocks. He finds that locals have higher profits than foreign investors, suggesting that they might 
be overall better informed. On the contrary, he finds that clients of global brokerages (which 
include foreigners) are better at picking long-term winners than clients of local brokerages (which 
don’t include foreigners). As an explanation, the author suggests that global institutions might 
have better information in picking long-term winners which they pass on to their clients. 
However, since the identity of the traders are not observed, the study heavily depends on the 
assumption that all the transactions are done by a representative investor with fixed investment 
horizon and risk preferences. Moreover, it is unclear why the global brokerage advantage can 
only be captured by its several clients in the long term, but not in the short-term as implied by a 
model of competitive informed traders as Holden and Subramanyam (1994).   
 To estimate the probability of informed trading for the two groups of investors this paper 
extends the models of Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) and Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001)2. 
There are two fundamental assumptions on those models. First, informed traders will actively 
trade to exploit their information advantage.  In those days when informed traders have 
information, they will increase the number of trades in the direction of the information; however, 
they will stay away from the market in days without information. The second assumption is that 
competitive liquidity providers will react to an increasing number of trades in one direction by 
                                                 
2 Those models or their extensions have been used, among others,  by Easley et al (1998), Gramming, 
Schiereck, and Theissen, (2001), Heidle and Huang(2002), Cruces and Kawamura (2005), and Vega (2006). 
However, to our knowledge, they haven’t been used to investigate the question of this paper.  
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increasing the bid-ask spread. The models don’t rely on assumptions on the risk-premium model, 
or the investment horizon of the different group of investors; nor are they restricted to specific 
information events.   
Taking advantage of the estimated PIN numbers for foreigners and locals, we explore the 
relationship between information and liquidity in our sample data. The microstructural models of 
Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987) explain liquidity, 
measured either as the bid-ask spread or as the price impact function, as a consequence of the 
probability of informed anonymous traders in the trading venue. Consequently, the hypothesis 
that foreign investors are any different than locals in terms of information, can be tested by 
regressing the liquidity on PINF and PINL. We find that both PINF and PINL have positive and 
significant effects on liquidity, as predicted by the theory. Moreover, we also find that the effect 
of foreigner informed trades tends to be statistically larger. 
Additionally, we investigate the type of firms where foreigners and locals tend to be more 
informed. By studying the cross sectional distribution of PINL and PINF, we show that whereas 
local investors tend to be better informed on smaller and more volatile firms, informed foreigners 
prefer larger and less volatile, firms and firms with larger foreign ownership. These results 
provide direct evidence in support of Edison and Warnock (2004) and Kang and Stulz (1997) who 
suggest that foreigners invest in larger and more actively traded firms in order to maximize their 
information advantage.   
On the other hand, it is expected that the traders in a market be informed not only with 
respect to firms, but also, to some extent, with respect to market-wide variables. If this is so, we 
should expect a positive effect on the liquidity not only from the stock PIN numbers but also from 
the market wide level of information, measured with market-wide averages of each PIN number. 
We find a positive relationship between the bid-ask spreads and the level of market-wide foreign 
information, even after controlling for PINs and other firm-specific variables, but not such a 
relationship with the level of market-wide local information. This foreign market-wide effect is 
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consistent with foreign investors having an edge in processing macro information, as suggested 
by Seasholes (2004), as well as with international analysts incorporating macro information in 
emerging markets as in Chan and Hameed (2005).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents and discusses the 
Hypotheses. Section 2 explains the empirical model used to estimate PINL and PINF. Section 3 
discusses the data, Section 4 presents the results of the model and the subsequent regressions and 
analysis and Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Hypothesis 
 
The question of whether foreign investors are better or less informed than locals can be better 
defined by examining it in three dimensions: First, who makes most of the informed trades in a 
market; second, given the type of investor, foreign or local, who is more likely to be informed; 
and third, whose informed trades have a larger impact on the liquidity of stocks. In principle, any 
combination of answers might be possible.  The answers to those questions will guide the first 
three hypotheses of the paper.  
Who’s responsible for most of the informed trades in an emerging market such as Indonesia? 
If we start from the neutral assumption that foreign investors are no different than the average 
local investor, then locals should do more of the informed trades in the Jakarta stock Exchange, 
since they do most of the trades 3.  This null Hypothesis is compatible with the literature in Home 
bias and the models of Brennan and Cao (1997) and Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2004). We’ll test 
this hypothesis by estimating the probability of informed trading by foreigners (PINF) and the 
probability of informed trading by locals (PINL) for each individual stock on a monthly basis.  
                                                 
3 Richards(2005) reports that foreigners made 23% of the trading value during 1999-200. Table 2 shows that 
Locals dominate the trading across the different size quintiles for the studied period.   
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The Null Hypothesis requires that PINL ≥ PINF for the market as a whole. In contrast, we propose 
the following alternative hypothesis: 
 
H1: Foreign investors do more informed trades than locals. This will be measured as: 
PINL < PINF 
 
The question can be posed alternatively as: given the investor type, foreign or local, how 
likely is she to be informed? This question is important for understanding the relative composition 
of each group. One possibility is that foreign investors are mostly uninformed investors driven by 
motives different than information, like herding, portfolio rebalancing, return chasing, as 
suggested by Sias (2004), Bonser-Neal et al (2002) and Griffin, Nardari and Stulz (2004). 
Alternatively, foreigners are mostly sophisticated informed investors, namely foreign institutions, 
that use superior technology to make better predictions of earning surprises and macroeconomic 
variables, analyze public information, and detect mispriced firms, like in Seasholes (2004) and 
Barber et al (2005).  To the null hypothesis that foreigners are not different than locals as far as 
information is concerned we oppose the following alternative hypothesis: 
 
H2: Given the type of investor, foreigners are more likely to be informed than locals. This 
will be measured as:  
                                            Prob( informed | Foreigner) >  Prob(informed | Local) 
 
The question can also be presented in terms of the differential effects of informed tradings of 
the two groups of investors, which is the most common path that the extant literature has taken.  If  
one group, either foreigners or locals, is better informed than the other we should expect that their 
trades earn higher returns as in Dvorak (2005), Froot and Ramadorai (2001) and  Huang and Shiu 
(2005), cause larger price impacts as in  Bonser-Neal et al. (1999) and Choe, Kho and Stulz 
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(2005), or better predict earning surprises as in Seasholes (2004). However, we take a different 
approach. As a direct consequence of the models of Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom (1987) 
and Easley and O'Hara (1987) we estimate the effects on liquidity of informed trading by each of 
the two groups. Liquidity should decrease in the event of increased information trading, since 
liquidity providers increase the bid-ask spread or the slope of the price/volume schedule to 
compensate for the increased probability of informed traders. Thus, in a regression of the bid-ask 
spread against PINF and or PINL the effect of those two variables should be positive. Moreover 
the model of Easley and O’Hara (1987) will imply that the group with more information will have 
a higher effect on the proportional spread. Here, the null Hypothesis is that the both effects are the 
same, and the respective alternative hypothesis is :  
 
H3 : The effect of foreign informed investors on the proportional bid-ask spread is different 
from the effect of local informed investors. This will be measured in a regression of the 
spread on PINF and PINL as :   
Coefficient of PINF  ≠ Coefficient of PINL. 
 
On the other hand, as to the foreign trading preferences, Edison and Warnock (2004) and 
Kang and Stulz (1997) argue that foreigners prefer to invest in larger, high volume firms and 
firms with American Depository receipts (ADR) to minimize their information disadvantage. 
Huang and Shiu (2005) also provide evidence that foreign investors in Taiwan have an 
information advantage over locals particularly in those firms with larger foreign ownership. 
Accordingly, we propose the following alternative hypothesis:  
 
H4. Foreign informed traders are more active in larger firms, higher volume firms, firms with 
ADRs and firms with higher foreign ownership.  This can be tested regressing PINF and PINL 
in a set of firm specific characteristics.  
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Kang and Stulz (1997) in Japan, Seasholes (2004) in Taiwan, and Chan and Hameed (2005) 
in 45 emerging markets provide evidence consistent with foreign institutions having an advantage 
in terms of market-wide information. This presumed advantage should be manifested in foreign 
informed traders relatively trading more than informed locals in firms that better incorporate 
macro-wide information, such as larger firms or firms with high systematic risk. This will be 
tested along with Hypothesis 4 above.  On the other hand, if informed foreign trades contain any 
relevant market-wide information we should expect that the market-wide average of informed 
foreign trading has a negative effect on the liquidity of individual stocks, beyond what is 
explained by firm-specific factors.   Thus, to the null hypothesis of foreign informed traders being 
similar to informed locals we oppose the following alternative hypothesis: 
 
H5. A market-wide average of PINF is associated with lower liquidity of individual stocks to 
a larger extent than a market-wide average of PINL. This will be tested in a time series 
regression of the bid-ask spreads of individual firms, comparing the coefficients of the two 
market-wide information variables.  
 
2  Trading Model  
 
The model here proposed is an extension of the family of informed trading models of  Easley, 
Kiefer and O’Hara (1997), henceforth EKO, and Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001), henceforth 
EOS. In essence these two papers model the arrival of informed and uninformed traders in a 
market with a designated market-maker, and solve the relation between the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) and the size of the bid-ask spread. Additionally, they illustrate how the 
parameters of the model can be estimated from the total numbers of initiated buys and initiated 
sales (directional trades) in a daily basis. In this section we explain how this framework can be 
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extended to estimate the PINs of two types of investors, foreigners and locals in a limit order 
book market. This will be modeled in discrete-time, as in EKO, but allowing uninformed traders 
to place limit orders as in EOS. Moreover, we illustrate how this model can be estimated from the 
total number of buys and sells (no directional) for each of the two groups.   
2.1. Trade process modeling  
 
There are two types of agents in this market: foreigners and locals, which in turn can be 
either informed or uninformed.  The traded asset has a random value V, which is sampled at the 
start of each day from a fixed distribution. The information arrival and the distribution of V are 
modeled using two types of signals about V:  ΨF , which is known only by the foreign informed 
traders, and takes either the value  L (low) or H(high) with probabilities  δF and 1- δF, 
respectively; and ΨL, which is known only by the local informed traders, and takes either the 
value  L (low) or H (high) with probabilities δL and 1- δL, respectively. We assume that the arrival 
of the two signals is given at the start of each trading day with probabilities αF  and αL 
respectively. Whenever foreign (local) information doesn’t happen in a given day the respective 
signal takes the value ΨF = 0 (ΨL= 0). Thus, there are nine different types of days, depending on 
the combinations of foreign and local signals, as illustrated in Figure 1.   
We assume that the real value of the asset V is known publicly at the end of the trading day, 
depending on the arrival of information. The real value of V as a function of the two signals is 
given as follows:  
 
      Local  
signal 
 
Foreign  
signal 
ΨL = L ΨL = 0 ΨL = H 
ΨF = L V0F   +  V0L V1F   + VL* V0F   +  V1L 
ΨF = 0 VF*  +  V0L VF* + VL* VF*   + V1L 
ΨF = H V1F  + V0L V0F  + VL* V1F  +  V1L 
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Where V0F , V1F are parameters that bound the information on V known by informed 
foreigners, with V0F < V1F .   Likewise,  V0L , V1L ,  with V0L < V1L,  bound the information known 
by informed locals. Besides,  VF*  VL*, are the unconditional values of the information on V, 
known by foreigners and local, respectively, as given by:   
        VF*  =  V0F  ×δF  + V1F×( 1- δF )              VL*  =  V0L  ×δL  + V1L×( 1- δL )      [1] 
 
The liquidity in the market comes from a limit order book, and there is not designated 
market-maker. We assume that the liquidity providers are uninformed, risk-neutral and 
competitive, similar to the market maker on EKO and EOS. The competitive bid and ask prices 
are determined by the perfect competence between the liquidity providers, but taking into account 
the probability of informed trading so that in expectation the profit of the liquidity provided is 
zero. Besides, there is a probability φ that the next limit order to be traded, either in the bid or the 
ask side, has been placed by an uninformed foreigner. 
 The informed traders, either foreign or local, place buy (sell) market orders during days 
when their respective signal is high (low), and don’t trade in days when there is no signal. 
Furthermore, we assume they don’t use limit orders. As discussed in EOS (p.34), this is a 
reasonable assumption provided that the information is short-lived and there is competition 
between the informed traders to exploit it. If the informed trader submits a limit order, the price 
can move against her position, impeding her to exploit the information advantage.  Additionally, 
we assume that each group of informed traders are risk neutral, and therefore, the potential 
information of the other group is irrelevant for their decision to trade. 
Trade happens in intervals, making this a discrete time model as EKO. The trading day is 
divided in a fixed number of intervals. In each interval there are only two possibilities: either 
there is a trade or a no-trade, but there can’t be multiple trades in an interval. We’ll show that the 
choice of the total number of intervals doesn’t change the relevant results of the model, assuming 
a sufficient high number of intervals.  
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The arrival of information before the trading day is illustrated for each one of the nine types 
of days in Figure 1, at the left of the dashed line. In the first node nature decides if there is an 
informed signal ΨF for foreigners with probability αF and whether it is low or high, with 
probabilities δF and 1-δF. Similarly, in the second node, nature decides if there is an informed 
signal for locals with probability αL, and whether it is low or high, with probabilities δL and 1- δL. 
We allow for the two signals to be correlated by means of the parameter ρ. If  ρ= 0, the two 
signals are independent, ρ>0 implies a positive correlation between the occurrence of both 
signals, and ρ<0, a negative correlation4.  In general, there will be days with both foreign and 
local information, days with only foreign, days with only local, and days with neither one, with 
probabilities: αF αL + ρ , αF (1- αL) - ρ,  αL(1-αF) - ρ and (1-αF)(1-αL) + ρ,  respectively. 
The arrivals of foreign informed traders, local informed traders and uninformed trades are 
given by the parameters μF,  μL,  and  ε, respectively. The different possibilities of trading on the 
first interval of the day are illustrated in the probability tree of Figure 1, at the right of the dashed 
line. For example, given that there is a low foreign signal (ΨF = L) and no local signal (ΨL = 0), 
the probability that a sell market order from a foreign informed market order arrives and be 
executed is given by μF, as illustrated in the second branch of Figure 1.  With probability 1-μF 
there is no informed trade and then two things might happened: either a market order from an 
uninformed trader arrives and trades, with probability ε, or there is no trade at all, with probability 
1- ε, as represented by the module A in Figure 1 5. The arriving uninformed trader will be equally 
likely to place a market buy as to place a market sell. She will be a foreigner with probability φ , 
or a local with probability 1-φ. Besides, no matter what type of trader placed the market order, the 
matching limit order is a placed by a foreigner with probability φ or by a local with a probability 
1- φ. Thus, the probability of a foreign buy in a trading interval is μF φ + (1- μF)εφ, adding the 
                                                 
4   By construction ρ is to be restricted in a range : max(αL+αF-1, 0) - αLαF  ≤  ρ  ≤ min(αL, αF) - αLαF  . The 
correlation between the two signals is given by   ρ / (αL ( 1- αL ) αF ( 1- αF ) )½  
5 (1- ε)   includes both the cases when no market order arrives and when a market order arrives but is not 
executed since the limit order book doesn’t have a matching limit order.  
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foreign buys by market orders with those by limit orders. Likewise, the probabilities of a foreign 
sell, a local buy, a local sell and a no-trade in a trading interval are given by μF + (1- μF)εφ, μF (1-
φ)+(1- μF)ε(1-φ), (1- μF)ε(1- φ)  and  (1- μF)(1-ε) , respectively. The trading processes on the other 
days with only one signal are analogous to the one just described, and are represented in the 
fourth, sixth and eight branches of Figure 1.  
On the other hand, there are four types of days with both local and foreign signals, 
represented in the first, third, seventh and ninth branches of Figure 1. In those days there is the 
possibility that both a foreign and a local informed trader arrive at the same interval. Since there 
can only be one trade, we break the tie giving each one a 50% chance. Thus, in the trading 
intervals of those days the probability of having a foreign informed trade is μF( 1- ½ μL)  and the 
probability of having a local informed trade is μL( 1- ½ μF)6, while the probability of having a 
trade originated in an uninformed market order trade  is  (1- μF)( 1- μL)ε, and the probability of 
having a no-trade is (1- μF)(1- μL)(1- ε).  
The remaining type of day to describe is the one when there is no foreign or local signal (ΨF 
= 0, ΨL = 0), presented in the fifth branch of Figure 1. In the trading intervals of those days there 
are only two possibilities, illustrated in the module A, either a trade among uninformed traders or 
a no-trade, with probabilities ε and 1- ε, respectively. Finally, as in EKO and EOS, we assume 
that the arrival of investors is independent in each interval. Thus, the probability tree will be 
extended from the first interval on, with each interval repeating the possibilities of the first, 
starting from each of the last nodes of the previous interval.  
As illustrated above, the probability structure is determined by the parameters αF, αL, δF, δL, ρ, 
μF , μL, ε and φ, which allows us to calculate the probability of any type of trade. Second, the 
liquidity providers observe whether a trade was buyer or seller initiated, but also the type, 
foreigner or local, of the trader that placed the market order. They also know the structure of the 
                                                 
6This assumption is necessary for the restriction of just one trade per interval, required for tractability, but it 
is unlikely to have any consequences in the estimation when  μL and  μF are sufficiently small.  
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trade process, the parameters, and sequence of past trades on the day. What they don’t know is if 
either of the two information signals has occurred or not, and if so,  whether the signal has been 
high or low. However, based on the information they possess, the liquidity providers can infer the 
conditional probabilities of each of the nine states of the nature. Accordingly, at the beginning of 
each trading interval the bid (ask) will be given by the expected value of the asset given that the 
next transaction is a market sale (buy), taking into account the history of transactions during the 
day, in a similar manner to equations (2) and (3) of EOS. Intuitively, the more likely the 
occurrence of any of the 4 information signals (ΨF = L, ΨF = H, ΨL = L, ΨL = H), the wider will be 
the bid-ask spread, to compensate for increasing potential losses to informed traders. For 
example, in a day with a particularly high number of foreign buy market orders the liquidity 
providers will infer an increased probability of a high foreign signal (ΨF = H). This will drive up 
the expected value of the asset, and widen the bid-ask spread.  
 
2.2. Estimating the model from the data 
We assume that the econometrician observes the total numbers of foreign buys, foreign sales, 
local buys, locals sells and no-trades in each trading day, classified regardless of the direction of 
trade, as given by the vector Γ = [FB, FS, LB, LS, NT]’  7. Unlike in EKO and EOS, he is unable 
to distinguish between an foreign initiated buy, which is likely to be informed, from a foreign 
limit order buy, which is necessarily uninformed by assumption. Next, we will show that, in spite 
of that limitation, the model can still be estimated by maximum likelihood as in those two papers, 
and used for the purposes of this study.  
First, let’s consider the probability of a given vector of trades Γ, given that we know the 
occurrence of the two signals (ΨF, ΨL). As in EKO, since the occurrence of trades is independent 
between intervals, the probability of a given vector of trades Γ is proportional to the product of 
the individual probabilities for each type of trade in a trading interval. To illustrate this, we 
                                                 
7 This assumption allows us to use the data provided by Jakarta Stock Exchange to estimate the model.  
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continue with the example of the low foreign signal day.  The probability of a given vector of 
trades in such a type of day is:  
 
Pr{ Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = 0}=  
CΓ [μF φ+(1- μF)εφ]FB [μF +(1- μF)εφ]FS [μF (1-φ)+(1- μF)ε(1-φ)]LB [(1- μF)ε(1- φ)] LS  [(1- μF)(1-ε)]NT    [A1] 8 
  
Similarly, the probabilities of a given vector of trades as a function of the parameters in the 
remaining 8 types of days are given in Appendix A. The next step is expressing the unconditional 
probability of the vector trade as function of the probability of each of the 9 types of days and the 
conditional probabilities ([A1] to [A9])  , using the law of total probabilities:  
 
Pr{Γ| αF , αL, δF , δL,  μL, μF, ε, φ} =     ( αF (1- αL)δF  -  ρ ) Pr{Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = 0}  
+ ( αF (1- αL)(1-δF) -  ρ )  Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = 0}  + ( (1-αF )αLδL -  ρ )  Pr{Γ|ΨF = 0, ΨL = L}  
+ ( (1-αF )αL(1-δL) -  ρ ) Pr{Γ | ΨF = 0, ΨL = H} + ( αF αLδFδL + ρ ) Pr{Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = L}   
+ ( αF αLδF(1-δL) + ρ )  Pr{Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = H}+  ( αF αL(1-δF) δL + ρ )  Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = L} 
+ ( αF αL(1-δF)(1-δL) + ρ ) Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = H} +(  (1-αF)(1-αL) + ρ )  Pr{Γ |ΨF = 0, ΨL = 0} 
[ 2]  
Multiple days will be needed to estimate all the 8 parameters of the model. Clearly the 
parameters αF , αL , δF , δL and ρ can’t be estimated with one day of information since the 
information signals happen only once a day. Moreover, the vector of observations per day, made 
up by five elements, has only three degrees of freedom, impeding to estimate the four intraday 
parameters μL, μF, ε, and φ from one single day9. Thus, as in EKO and EOS, we estimate the 
                                                 
8 Where CΓ is the number of ways of arranging combinations FB foreign buys, FS foreign sales, LB local 
buys, LS local sells and NT non-trade intervals. As explained in EKO this factor involves data, not 
parameters, is constant for each trading day, has no effect on the estimated parameters by maximum 
likelihood, and thus, can be dropped from the equation. 
9 Two degrees of freedom are lost since  FBd+FSd+LBd+LSd+2NTd is equal to twice the total number of 
trading intervals, a constant, and : FBd+LBd = FSd +LSd. 
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model over a period of consecutive days.  The likelihood function over a period of D consecutive 
days as given by:  
 
     ε,,μ ,μ ,,δ ,δ ,α ,α|Pr ε,,μ ,μ  , ,δ ,δ ,α ,α)'(L LFLFLFdD
1d
LFLFLF
D
1dd  

              [3] 
 
Calculating the likelihood function over D consecutive days assumes, first, that the daily 
arrival of both types of signals is independent from day to day, and second, that the parameters 
stay constant over the period of calculation. We can estimate the parameters, maximizing the log 
of the likelihood function of the model over the D days.  As in EOS, the optimization itself is 
performed, not on the original parameters, but over a logit transformation of them10. This 
transformation is particularly important to obtain meaningful standard errors, especially when the 
estimated parameters are close to zero or one. Before the optimization itself, we perform a grid 
search over 512 (=29) combinations of values of the nine parameters, to obtain different sets of 
initial values for the optimization. The best five combinations of initial values found in the grid 
search are used alternatively in the optimization procedure to improve the search for the global 
maximum of [3]. After the optimization procedure, the optimal transformed parameters are 
converted back into the original parameters reversing the logit transformation. The asymptotic 
standard errors of the logit-transformed parameters are obtained using the inverted Hessian at the 
optimum, and are used to estimate the standard errors of the original parameters by means of the 
delta method11.  
The Probability of informed trading (PIN) is the most important result of this model. Defined 
as the probability that a trader in the market be informed, this variable is easily estimated from the 
                                                 
10 The original parameters, except ρ,  are in [0,1], while the logit-transformed parameters belong to (-∞,∞). 
As noted above, ρ is constrained to be between two values that are functions of αF and αL, so it requires an 
extra transformation.    
11 Greene(2001) compares  three possibilities for the estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of errors 
for the maximum likelihood procedure.  
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parameters of the model12. Moreover, PIN is easily decomposed in two parts, the probability of 
foreign informed trading (PINF) and the probability of local informed trading (PINL) as follows:  
)ε)(1μμρε))(1μα)(1μα(1 2(1
 μμ½ρ)μ½α(1μα
)ε)(1μμρε))(1μα)(1μα(1 2(1
μμ½ρ )μ½α(1μα 
PINPINPIN
LFFFLL
LFFFLL
LFFFLL
LFLLFF
L  F






[ 4 ] 
  
These relations allow us to calculate PINF,  PINL and PINL - PINF as functions of the 
parameters that maximize the likelihood function [3]. Note that the variables δF, δL and φ don’t 
play any role in [eq 4], so failing to estimate any of them won’t impede to estimate the two PIN 
numbers. The standard errors of the PIN numbers and their difference are obtained via the delta 
method from the standard errors of the transformed parameters. We are also interested in the 
probability of informed trading given the type of investor, which can be easily expressed as a 
function of the estimated parameters:  
L
LL
L
F
FF
F
PIN)(1PIN)(1
PIN
)Prob(Local
PIN
]Local |dob[informePrPINlConditiona
PINPIN)(1
PIN
gner)Prob(Forei
PIN
]Foreigner |medProb[inforPINlConditiona




           [ 5] 
                                
While the PIN numbers in [4] estimate the proportion of informed foreigners and locals with 
respect to the total population of investors, the conditional probabilities in [5] measure the 
proportion of informed traders within each group.   
 For illustration purposes, we present on Table 1 the results of the estimating model from 
simulated daily data. Starting from a vector of known parameters, we simulate a 65 days of 
trading, roughly a quarter, with 480 intervals each day, obtaining 65 vectors Γd, made up of 
foreign buys, foreign sales, local buys, local sales and no-trades.  
                                                 
12 Alternatively, PINF (PINL) can be defined as the probability of the arrival of a foreign (local) informed 
market order, as defined in the model of EOS, but that simply means to rescale by 2 the adopted definition.  
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Initially, the number of no-trades is computed assuming that the real value, 480 intervals per 
day, is known. Optimizing the likelihood function [3], we find the estimated parameters using the 
65 days of simulated values. The resulting estimated parameters and the computed PIN numbers, 
as well as their asymptotic standard errors, are presented in the second row of Table 1. The 
estimation appears precise, particularly for ε, φ, μL, and μF . While the estimation for αF , αL,  PINF  
and  PINL  seems fairly precise, δL and δF are not so well estimated. Indeed, when we use real 
market data in section 4, we find that the model is unable to provide small standard errors for δF 
and δL  in a number of cases. This is simply a consequence of not separating buys (sells) made 
with market orders from those made with limit orders. However, this limitation is irrelevant for 
the purpose of this study since those parameters are not needed for the estimation of the PIN 
numbers. In  a series of unreported simulations we tested the ability of model to estimate different 
combinations of true parameters based on simulated data. In the vast majority of the cases, the 
maximum likelihood of function [3] is able to identify with good precision the original parameters 
of the model and the PINs, sometimes with the exception of  δF, and δL.  
On the other hand, the total number of trading intervals per day is a parameter not observed, 
but assumed by the econometrician. However, the assumed number of trading interval doesn’t 
affect the estimation of PIN, as long as it is large enough. This is illustrated in Table 1, presenting 
the results of estimating the model based on the same 65 days of trading but assuming a total of 
960 intervals per day. In the two cases, the estimations and standard errors of αF,  αL, δF, δL and ρ 
are the same as in the first estimation, as expected, since the effects of those parameters are 
observed in a daily basis. On the other hand, the estimators of μL, μF, and ε tend to decrease 
proportionally to the assumed number of daily intervals, which is also expected since this 
parameters measure the frequency of informed and uninformed market order arrivals13. However, 
                                                 
13 Strictly speaking the inverse proportional relation between  μL, μF, and ε  with  the number of total 
intervals is only true in the limit when NT is very large compared with FB+FS+LB+LS and the arrival of 
market orders becomes a Poisson process, as in EOS. For our purposes it will suffice to choose a NT large 
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those proportional changes tend to cancel with each other in the estimation of PINF and PINL in 
[4] and those variables and their asymptotic standard errors remains about the same. Thus, we 
expect that the assumed number of trading intervals won’t affect the relevant results of the model, 
and, as a rule, when calculating the model on real data, we assume a number of trading intervals 
at least double of the maximum number of trades in a single day. 
The fourth and fifth rows of Table 1 show the results of estimating the model based on a 
month of simulated data, 22 trading days, assuming 480 and 960 trading intervals respectively. As 
expected, the asymptotic errors obtained are larger than for the previous cases. However, the 
estimation is still reasonably precise for most of the parameters.  
Finally, given the finite sample used to estimate the model, the reported asymptotic standard 
errors are not necessarily good estimators of the true standard errors.  To account for that we run a 
series of Monte Carlo simulations (unreported), finding that, for quarterly estimation the 
asymptotic standard error for the PINs should be multiplied by 1.5, and for monthly estimation by 
2.0, to have a conservative estimation of the true standard error.    
 
3. Market Description and Data 
 
The Jakarta Stock Exchange (henceforth JSE) is the main stock market in Indonesia.  It is 
organized as a continuous limit order book market, without designated market makers. Since May 
1995 the orders are processed by means of a computerized system, and since March 2002 a 
remote trading system is in place. The market comprises four boards, namely the regular, cash, 
crossing and negotiated boards. The regular board is the market for retail transactions and it is the 
largest of the four, accounting for about 80% of the trading value of the JSE. In the negotiated 
board the terms of the transactions are agreed directly between two brokers, while in the crossing 
board a trade is done by a broker that has two matching buy and sell orders. Trades over 20,000 
                                                                                                                                                 
enough compared to the daily maximum number of transactions in the firm-quarter to guarantee that the PIN 
numbers and their asymptotic errors are independent of NT.  
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shares are usually processed by the crossing or the negotiated boards. Finally, in the cash board 
the settlement of trades is done the same day, unlike the regular board, where settlements occur 
on the third trading day after the transaction. 
By middle 2006, the JSE is already considered a quite transparent market. At any given time,  
the investors can know not only the best bid and ask quotes and respective depths, but also the 
following five quotes and depths on both sides of the limit order book, in screens provided by 
different data vendors. Changes to the limit order book are updated in real time. After each 
transaction, agents in the market can observe not only the price and size of the transaction, but 
also the brokerage firm and the type, whether local of foreigner, of the two parties. This way, the 
market participants can tell if foreign or local investors are actively trading any given stock, and if 
they are net buying or selling. This makes the JSE an ideal case-study for the differential 
information between the two types of investors. Further market description on the JSE can be 
found in Bonser-Neal et al (1999), (2005) and Dvorak (2005) 
From the JSE we obtain four separate datasets for the period April 2004 to March 2006. The 
first dataset compiles the daily statistics for each individual stock. It includes open, maximum, 
minimum and close prices, along with closing bid and ask prices and their respective closing 
depths, the number of transactions, volume and value traded for each stock day. These statistics 
are based on transactions on trades and quotes on the regular board, not including trades from the 
other three boards14. 
The second dataset consists of the volume of shares sold and the volume of shares bought per 
day and per stock by foreign investors in all four boards. The third database compiles the total 
daily volume traded by stock in each one of the four boards.  To note, none of the three datasets 
registers the number of buys and sells by foreigners and locals, required by the informed trading 
model. To estimate the required variables we need to make two assumptions: First, we assume 
                                                 
14 This limitation for our analysis also happens in the NYSE, where data on the upstairs market is not usually 
available. However, as indicated, most of the trading volume takes place in the regular board.  
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that, in a given stock-month, the average size trade for foreigners in the regular board is about the 
same as for locals. Thus, we approximate the number of buys and sells in the regular board by 
foreigners (locals), as proportional to the volume traded by foreigners (locals) in the regular board 
and the total number of transactions by stock-day, taken from the first database.  Second, we 
assume that the volume bought (sold) by foreigners in a stock in the regular board is proportional 
to the fraction of the daily volume traded in the regular board relative to the daily volume of the 
four boards. Using those two assumptions we estimate the number of daily foreign and local buys 
and sells per stock as follows: 
 6FS
BoardRegular
nstransactioNumber_of_
LS:sellsLocalDaily
FB
BoardRegular
nstransactioNumber_of_
LB:buysLocalDaily
BoardsAll tradedshares Volume
BoardsAllFIby  sold shares Volume
BoardRegular
nstransactioNumber_of_
FS:sellsForeignDaily
BoardsAll tradedshares Volume
BoardsAllFIby bought  shares Volume
BoardRegular
nstransactioNumber_of_
FB:buysForeignDaily




 
Clearly, in the above procedure the average transaction size per group and board affects the 
estimation of the number of trades. This is not necessarily undesirable, since models as Easley 
and O´Hara (1987) imply that informed traders tend to trade in larger sizes. However, it is 
uncertain how much the transaction size effect might distort the main results of this paper. 
Consequently, we use a transaction database from JSE for the period April 2005 to July 2005, as 
an alternative source to estimate the vectors of trades. That database includes every transaction 
completed, identifying not only the date, stock, price, size and type of buyer and seller (foreigner 
or local), but also the board where the transaction takes place. Using this database we are able to 
compute exactly, for each stock-day, the number of buys and sell for each group of investors in 
the regular board (FB, FS, LB and LS). This alternative database will be used to run robustness 
checks on the major results of the paper.   
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Finally, the last dataset reports the number of shares owned by foreign investors per day and 
per stock, along with the maximum allowed share of ownership for foreigners. Although in the 
past foreign investors were banned from owning more than 50% in some strategic industries, 
these limits have been lifted, and since 1999 foreigners can own up to 100% in all type of firms, 
except banks, where they can still own up to 99%. Thus, we don’t expect that foreign ownership 
limits constitute an important factor in our analysis.   
After merging the four datasets by firm and day, we eliminate those pertaining to warrants 
and rights, ending with 359 stocks. Then, we group the observations by stock-month and by 
stock-quarters for the purposes of estimating the informed trading model explained in section 2. 
Furthermore, we eliminate those months or quarters which have no more than 6 trading days in 
the month or quarter, ending with 5,246 stock-months and 2,148 stock-quarters as the input data 
of the informed trading model.  
The summary statistics for the data are presented in Table 2, for the size deciles and for the 
total sample. It is apparent that most of the trading value and transactions take place in the top 
two size deciles, and that foreigners actively trading in those, while they don’t trade much on 
average in medium and small firms. Thus, we’ll devote special attention to the results of the 
informed trading model for large firms. Table 2 also shows that the ownership of foreign 
investors tends to be quite uniform across the size deciles, at an average of 16%, but, at the same 
time, there is considerable variation across firms in the same size decile.  
 
4. Results  
 
The summary statistics of the estimated parameters of the informed trading model are 
presented in Table 3, for the model estimated on stock-quarters, as well as for the model 
estimated on stock-months.  Out of the initial 2,148 stock-quarters and 5,246 stock-months we 
were able to estimate the model for 2,144 stock-quarters and 5,228 stock-months.  Most of the 
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observations for which the maximum likelihood didn’t converge belong to the lower deciles in 
volume, and were typically small firms15.  
Table 3 reports, as discussed in section 2, that the estimation for the parameters μL, μF, ε, φ is 
more precise than for αF , αL, δF , δL, ρ as given by the average standard errors.  Besides, as 
expected, the model is limited on detecting the sign of the information: the estimated errors of δF , 
δL are typically very high, as expected from the discussion in section 2. Notwithstanding, the 
parameters of interest PINL and PINF were estimated with reasonable precision, with average 
standard errors below 0.04 for both the stock-quarters  and stock-months, respectively. 
From Table 3, we don’t see a dramatic improvement in the standard errors by estimating the 
model by stock-quarters instead of stock-months. Moreover, the estimation by stock-months 
better allows for the intertemporal variation of the parameters of the model and to estimate the 
time series effects of PINL and PINF on liquidity. The informed trading model has been usually 
estimated in the literature using one month of daily data, as in EKO. For those reasons, 
henceforth, we will only present the results of the analysis using the parameters estimated by 
stock-months. The main inferences of the paper are also obtained but not reported using the 
parameters estimated by stock-quarters.  
The average estimated PINL and PINF are respectively 0.218 and 0.057 for the stock-month 
results, corresponding to an total average PIN of 0.28 which estimates the proportion of informed 
traders in the market. This value is comparable with, as the average between 0.16 to 0.22 reported 
by Easley et al (1996) for NYSE, and the averages between 0.17 and 0.29 for Latin American 
stock markets of Cruces and Kawamura (2005). 
We start looking into Hypothesis 1 by plotting the estimated PINF vs. PINL for each stock-
month in Figure 2.  Most of the points are concentrated below the 45 degrees line, not only for the 
overall sample, but also for the top three deciles where most of the foreign trading is 
                                                 
15 Easley et al (1996) also reports problems in estimating a similar model based on infrequently traded 
stocks.  
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concentrated. This is a strong indication that most of the informed trades are done by locals.  This 
is formally tested conducting a Wald test of the null-hypothesis PINF < PINL. As presented in the 
panel A of Table 4, this hypothesis is supported for the full sample as well as for each size 
deciles, at the 1% of significance level.  
Another test of this hypothesis is conducted by performing a Wald test on the hypothesis 
PINL - PINF = 0 for each stock-month, using the estimated difference PINL - PINF and its 
estimated error16. The results of this test are presented in Panel B of Table 4. For 46% of the 
entire sample we reject PINL = PINF  in favor of  PINL > PINF. For only 1% of the stock-months 
we reject it in favor of PINL <PINF , and for the remaining 53% the hypothesis is not rejected. The 
results are robust across the different size deciles and using the stock-quarter estimations of PINL 
and PINF and strongly support the ‘Home advantage’ side.   
The informed trading model assumes that only in those days with local (foreign) information 
the local (foreign) informed traders walk into the market, actively placing market orders. Thus, in 
this context, we can naturally ask whether the reported PINL > PINF is due to more frequent days 
of local information than foreigner information  (αL> αF ) or to more aggressive informed trading 
by locals than by foreigners (μL > μF) when information is present.  
Figure 3 illustrates the answer by plotting  αF vs αL and μF vs  μL  for each one of the stock-
months. In the graph of αF vs αL the points seem uniformly scattered, except some points 
concentrated in αF =0. On the contrary, in the graph of μF vs  μL  the points tend to lay below the 
45 degree line. This suggests that PINL is larger than PINF mostly because of more intensive 
trading by informed locals than more frequent arrivals of local information. A formal test is 
presented in Panel E of Table 4. On average, the mean of αL is significantly higher than the mean 
of αF, and that the same is true for μL with respect to μF. This result holds in all but the top decile. 
We conclude that PINL is larger than PINF  in general, due to both more intense informed trading 
                                                 
16 To reject PINL = PINF  at the 5% level  we required that the estimated difference PINL - PINF  be larger 
than four standard errors larger. This takes into account our findings regarding to the finite sample behavior 
of the asymptotic standard errors.  
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from locals than from foreigners, and to more frequent local informed days than foreign informed 
days.  
So far, the results indicate that locals execute most of the informed trades in the JSE, 
supporting the ‘Home advantage’ position. This finding is not too surprising, since local investors 
carry on 89 % of the average trading value by firm, while foreigners only contribute the 
remaining 11%, as indicated in Table 2. A different perspective results from asking what is the 
probability of informed trading given the type of investor, measured as Conditional PINF and 
Conditional PINL [5]. The answer will tell us whether foreign investors are as likely to be 
informed as locals, or more likely, as proposed by Hypothesis 2, and the relative proportion of 
informed and uninformed traders in each group.   
Figure 4 plots the probability of informed trading given that the investor is a foreigner 
(Conditional PINF) against the probability of informed trading given that the investor is local 
(Conditional PINL). The result goes completely opposite to the one on Figure 2: most of the 
points lay above the 45 degree line, indicating that the proportion of informed traders in the 
foreign group is higher than for the local group for most stock-months. This finding is confirmed 
by testing the null hypothesis that Conditional PINF = Conditional PINL as indicated in Panel D of 
Table 4. This hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % level both for the full sample and for all the size 
deciles. For the full sample the average probability of informed trading given that a foreigner 
arrives to the market is 47%, while when the market order comes from a local is 26%. 
An alternative way to present those results is estimating the average composition of informed 
locals, uninformed locals, informed foreigners and uninformed foreigners in the JSE. The shares 
of informed traders, both foreigners and locals, are given directly by PINF and PINL. On the other 
hand, the share of uninformed traders in the market is presented in panel D of Table 417. 
Summarizing, the informed trading model estimates that, on average, 29% of the market 
                                                 
17  Calculated at stock-month level as follows: Share of uninformed foreigners = (1-PINL-PINF)φ;  Share of 
uninformed locals = (1-PINL-PINF) (1- φ).  
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participants are informed traders posting market orders, and 71% are uninformed, whether posting 
market orders or providing liquidity by means of limited orders. Foreigners constitute a small part 
of either group, accounting for 21 % of the informed traders and 9% of the uninformed. The ratio 
of informed to uninformed for foreigners is 1 to 1.13 , whereas for locals is 1:2.8. In summary, 
foreigners are more likely to be informed traders than locals, and conversely, less likely to be 
uninformed or liquidity providers, as argued by the ‘Big fish’ proponents18.   
Taken together, the results conciliate the ‘Home advantage’ and ‘Big Fish’ positions: 
Domestic investors are by far the source of most of the informed trading, but at the same time, 
they are an even larger proportion of the uninformed traders. Table 4 and Figure 5 show that this 
assertion is valid for all the size deciles of the JSE: Locals consistently make up most of the 
informed traders across the size deciles, although for the top deciles the gap between the two 
groups is largely reduced. On the other hand, foreigners are more likely to be informed than locals 
for all the deciles.  
As a robustness check, we run the informed trading model using the vector of trades 
computed from the JSE transaction database from April 2005 to July 2005. Although this sample 
represents just four months of trading activity, this database allow us to compute exactly the 
foreign buys, foreign sales, local buys and local sales in the regular board of JSE, without the 
assumptions implicit in [6].  The summary results are presented in panel C of Table 3, and panels 
F, G and H of Table 4 present the basic tests of the respective PIN numbers, as we did before.  
Apparently, these new results are in agreement with those already presented: Locals do most of 
the informed trades, while foreigners are more likely to be informed, both for the whole sample 
and for each one of the size deciles.  Moreover, this also indicates that differential in the average 
size of trades between the two groups of investors don’t seem to be driving the results 
                                                 
18 In a former version of this paper, the informed trading model was run for the period March 2004 to July 
2005,  assuming independence between the two signals, which is just a particular case of the present model 
with ρ =0. The results were qualitatively the same.  
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Next, we explore the differential effects of foreign and locals on the liquidity of the stocks. A 
direct implication of the theoretical models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and EOS is that 
higher PINs should lead to higher bid-ask spreads. Liquidity providers increase the bid-ask spread 
to compensate themselves because they expect to suffer higher losses to informed traders. 
Furthermore, the model of EOS implies that for a fixed PIN, the higher the potential information 
of the informed trader, the higher the expected losses for the liquidity provider, and the higher the 
spread19.  
Table 5 presents the results of regressing bid-ask spreads against PINF and PINL. The 
regressand is the log of the average proportional spread in the stock-month, as in Grullon, 
Kanatas and Weston (2004). Panel A presents a time-series regression of the spread on the firm 
specific variables traditionally associated with time-series changes in liquidity: value traded, 
return and volatility as in Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005). The model also includes 
firm-fixed effects to filter out cross-sectional effects, and a lag of the left-hand variable to control 
for its persistence and avoid autocorrelation in the residuals. The firm specific variables show up 
significant with the expected sign: negative for value traded and return and positive for volatility. 
Panel B includes PINF and PINL, yielding positive and significant effects from both variables, as 
implied by the theoretical models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and EOS. The effect of PINF is 
larger and more significant than the one of PINL.  A Wald test confirms that the null hypothesis of 
equal effects of PINF and PINL is rejected at the 5% level. As mentioned before the PIN measures 
are estimated with a sampling error that might induce an errors-in-variable problem. To mitigate 
this, we remove from the model any stock-month with standard errors larger than 0.05 for PINF or 
0.10 for PINL. Panel C reports the resulting model. The coefficients of PINF and PINL remain 
significant and positive, while the coefficients of the control variables show up with the expected 
                                                 
19 In our model the potential information of foreigners is given in [ 1] as V1F −V0F while for locals is V1L − 
V0L 
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sign. Supporting Hypothesis 3, there is still significant difference between the effects of the two 
groups of informed traders, as given by a Wald-test on the respective coefficients.  
Panels D to G explore the robustness of those findings. The model of Panel D uses the first 
half of the sample: stock-months until March 2005 inclusive, whereas Panel E uses the second 
half of the sample, from April 2005 on.  The model reported in Panel F works with the firms in 
the deciles 1 to 5 (smaller), while the one of Panel G uses the firms in the deciles 6 to 10 (larger). 
The results confirm that the positive effect of the PINs on liquidity are robust, and that the effect 
of PINF is larger and more significant than the effect of PINL 
Summarizing, the results of Table 5 reveal that both PIN variables have the effect on liquidity 
predicted by the theoretical models and, that PINF have a larger effect than PINL, not rejecting 
Hypothesis 3. We propose two possible interpretations for this. On the one hand, in the theoretical 
framework of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and EOS this implies that the potential information of 
foreigners is higher on average than for locals. On the other hand, it might be just a consequence 
of foreigners posting more aggressive orders compared to locals, as suggested by Bonser-Neal et 
al (2005).   
Before proceeding, it is important to discuss two alternative explanations of the results 
reported in Tables 4 and 5: one based on transaction size and the other based on inventory effects. 
First, it might be the case that part of what we detect as informed trades are simply larger trades. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that foreign institutional investors engage periodically in large 
portfolio rebalancing trades, which are not necessarily information-based, and might impact the 
bid-ask spreads as in Koski and Michaely (2000). However, there are at least three reasons to 
think that this ‘size effect’ is not driving our results. First, it is expected that most non-
information based larger trades (over 20,000 shares) be processed on the negotiated and crossing 
boards. Second, while this confounding size effect might take place on the top size deciles, where 
institutional investors trade the most, this would be hardly the case for the medium and lower size 
deciles where our main results still hold. And, third, while the estimation of the vector of trades in 
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[6] might be affected by the ‘size effect’, as noted before, when computing the vector of trades 
from the JSE transaction data each trade is counted independent of its size, so the results derived 
from this database won’t be subjected to this criticism.   
The second alternative explanation of our results is that the effect of the PINs on the spread 
might be reflecting inventory costs from the liquidity provider rather than information 
asymmetry, as in Grossman and Miller (1988) and Ho and Stoll (1983). Although it is clear that 
the informed trading model here presented, as well as those of EOK and EOS, doesn’t account for 
inventory effects on spreads, the inventory cost explanation creates more problems than it solves. 
In a limit market order such as the JSE without designated liquidity providers, one is left to guess 
who carry the inventory in the first place. One possible answer is that there are ‘ad-hoc’ liquidity 
providers simultaneously placing sell and limit orders and maintaining an inventory of the stock. 
However, two additional arguments further weaken the inventory cost explanation: First, Ahn et 
al (2002) provides evidence that inventory costs are less relevant in a limit-order market as the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, compared with a hybrid market as the NYSE. Second, those ‘ad-hoc’ 
liquidity providers are unlikely to appear in the medium and small firms of the JSE characterized 
by low turnovers and frequent no-trade days, where our main results hold.   
Next, we test whether both types of informed traders trade in the same type of firms. 
Hypothesis 4 poses that informed foreign investors trade in larger, higher volume firms, and firms 
with higher foreign ownership, where foreigners have less of a informational disadvantage. Figure 
5 and panel A of Table 4 suggest that this might be the case: Informed foreign traders seem to 
prefer larger firms, while local informed traders slightly prefer smaller ones. To formally test this 
hypothesis we set-up Tobit models that explain the cross-sectional distributions of PINF and PINL 
as functions of several firm characteristics, as presented in Table 6. Panel A presents the results of 
the Tobit models that regress PINF and PINL on size, volume and volatility. Panel B adds in the 
share of foreign ownership in the firm. Panel C includes two measures of the internationalization 
of the firm: the ratio export to sales and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has an ADR, 
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and the R2 of the regression of the firm returns against the market index return. As a robustness 
test, Panel D includes industry-fixed effects and, to control for the potential endogeneity of PINF 
and PINL, a one-month lag of PINF in the regression of PINL and vice versa 20.  Finally, Panel E 
and Panel F check for the robustness of the findings in the first and second half of the sample, 
respectively.  
The results of Table 6 shows unambiguously that PINL is higher the smaller and more 
volatile the firm, whereas PINF is higher for larger and less volatile firms. These results for PINL 
and PINF are robust in each of the alternative specifications presented in Table 6, even after 
controlling for industry effects and for the potential endogeneity of the two PIN variables, and in 
both the first and the second half of the sample ( panels D to F)  Additionally, Panels D to F show 
that informed locals and foreigners tend to trade in different types of firms, beyond the stated 
relations with size and volume: higher PINFs are associated with lower PINLs and the other way 
around, after controlling for firm-specific variables and industry-fixed-effects, reflecting that the 
two types of informed trading are substitute of each other.  
Taking the results of Panel D we confirm that these results are economically significant: 
moving from the percentile 25% to the percentile 75% in size is associated with a reduction of 
7.5% on PINL and a rise of 12% on PINF. Additionally, an increase of 10% in the PINF (PINL) is 
associated with a reduction of about 1% (0.8%) on PINL (PINF), holding constant size and trading 
volume. 
Panels B to F show that an increase of 10% in the share of ownership by foreigners is 
associated with a 1% increase in PINF, statistically significant in all the models, and a 0.5% 
reduction in PINL, significant in all but in F. This is evidence that, in the JSE, foreign ownership 
is associated to information advantage to some extent, as Huang and Shiu (2005) shows in 
Taiwan. On the other hand, two other factors that have been related to improved information for 
                                                 
20. Besides, it is likely that informed trading by locals hinders potential informed foreign traders and the 
other way around, creating a potential omitted-variable bias if those variables are not included.  
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foreigners, the ratio exports to sales and the ADR dummy variable, don’t appear related to higher 
PINFs once controlling for all the other firm specific variables.  
Finally, the results of Panels C to E show that both informed locals and foreigners tend to 
prefer firms with higher idiosyncratic risk, as given by the R2. While this might due to reversal 
causality—The more informed trading, the larger the idiosyncratic risk—this is also consistent 
with the claims of Morck et al. (2000) in the sense that analysts prefer more transparent firms, 
which in turn tend to have higher idiosyncratic risk,..  
Taken together these results are consistent with locals having an informational advantage in 
smaller and more volatile firms, while facing more competence from foreign investors in large, 
less volatile and higher foreign ownership firms. Thus, we provide direct evidence supporting 
some of the claims of Edison and Warnock (2004) and Kang and Stulz (1997) who conjectured 
that foreign investors reduce their information disadvantage by trading in the upper deciles of 
size. 
Alternatively, the results are also consistent with foreign investors being better at processing 
macro information as suggested by the results of Seasholes (2004) in Taiwan and the study of 
Chan and Hameed (2005) on the effect of foreign analysts in emerging markets. If a group of 
investors is better at gathering and processing information that concerns the entire market, it is 
expected that they trade in the largest and most traded stocks, since those can provide an 
approximation to the market portfolio with reduced transaction costs. In fact, for the sample 
period, the 33 firms of the top size decile represented 83% of the market capitalization of the JSE. 
Thus, we have two different, but not incompatible, explanations for the increased information of 
foreigners in the largest firms: they might be better in processing firm-specific information for 
that group of firms or they might be better at obtaining market-wide information, which they 
exploit by trading in the largest firms21.  
                                                 
21 Institutional factors might be playing a role. Freeman and Bartels (2000) reports that 55% of the 
institutional investors surveyed won’t invest in Indonesian firms under US$ 50 M. However, as presented in 
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According with Hypothesis 5, if foreigner trades contain some market-wide information, a 
rise in the activity of foreign investors in the market should be taken as a signal of increased 
asymmetric information by the liquidity providers, triggering an overall increase on the bid-ask 
spreads. We test this implication in Table 8, which presents the results of a time-series regression 
of the proportional bid-ask spread on market-wide averages of the PIN variables, controlling for 
the firm-specific PINF and PINL and the usual control variables.  
As a starting point, panel A of Table 7 reproduces the basic time-series regression of the 
proportional bid-ask spread on firm variables and firm-fixed effects, from panel B of Table 5. 
Panels B and C include, respectively, the value-weighted averages of PINF, PINL for the market, 
that measure the overall level of foreign and local information on the JSE.  Interestingly, the 
effect of the market PINF is positive and significant, while the effect of the market PINL is smaller 
and not significantly different from zero. Those results are still present when we use both 
variables in the model presented in panel D. Moreover, The PINF effect appears both in the first 
and in the second part of the sample (panels E and F) and turns up significantly higher than the 
effect of the PINL at the usual confidence levels, using a Wald test (unreported). Overall, the 
results of the models B to F indicate that the level of informed foreign activity in the market is 
associated with a reduction on liquidity, even after controlling for the individual PINF and PINL of 
each stock-month and the usual confounding effects 22.  
We are interested in understanding whether this macro-wide effect of PINF is incorporated in 
the market-wide level of liquidity of the market23. For this purpose, we incorporate a value-
weighted average of the proportional bid-ask spread in the model, presented in panel G, that 
                                                                                                                                                 
Table 2, the average share of foreigner ownership tends to be similar in every size decile of the JSE, so this 
can not be a complete explanation of the distribution of PINF 
22 The results are robust at using equally weighted averages of PINs and spread, instead of value weighted 
averages (unreported). Besides, the effect of PINF  is also economically significant.  Going from the 
minimum to the maximum of the monthly  value-weighted averaged PINF in the sample (+10% change) is 
associated with an average growth of 16% in the proportional bid-ask spreads, according to the results in 
panel D. 
23 Also called systematic liquidity’ by a strand of the literature that starts with Chordia, Roll and  
Subhramanyam (2000). 
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leaves the effect of market PINF reduced but still significant. This suggests that the market-wide 
effect of PINF is only partially incorporated in the market-wide liquidity of JSE 
Thus, the evidence points to foreign informed traders having not only firm-specific but also 
market-specific information, unlike informed locals, providing support for Hypothesis 5. This is 
consistent with foreigners being better at processing macro information as suggested by Seasholes 
(2004) for Taiwan, and the results of Chan and Hameed (2005).  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Studying the case of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, this paper addresses the question of who is 
better informed, foreigners or locals in emerging markets. We discuss three alternative ways to 
define this question:  first, who is responsible for most of the informed trades in the market; 
second, given the type of investor, who is more likely to be informed; and third, whose trades 
have a larger negative impact on the bid-ask spreads.  
The empirical strategy adopted starts by extending the model of Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara 
(1996), and Easley, O’Hara and Saar (2001) to a market where the liquidity is provided by a limit 
order book, and with two types of investors, which in turn can be informed or uninformed. We 
show how the parameters of the model can be estimated from observing the total buys and sells of 
both groups on a daily basis. Then, we show how to estimate the probability of informed trading 
(PIN) for both foreigners and locals separately.  
We estimate the extended model with data from the Jakarta Stock Exchange, obtaining the 
PIN numbers for foreigners and locals on a stock-month basis. The analysis of those results 
provides direct answers to the three questions:  First, locals do most of the informed trades, both 
at an aggregate market level as well as for most of the stock-months. Second, given the type of 
investors, foreigners are more likely to be informed than locals, both at an aggregate market level, 
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as well as for most of the stock-months. Third, both types of informed trading have a negative 
effect on the proportional bid-ask spreads, having the foreigners a larger negative impact.  
In conclusion, locals are more informed in Indonesia, agreeing with Dvorak (2005) and the 
literature on ‘Home bias’. But, at the same time, the overall result is consistent with foreigners 
being more sophisticated investors, more likely to trade on information than the average local, 
and with larger firm and market wide effects on liquidity, in agreement with the results of 
Seasholes (2005) and Huang and Shui(2005) for Taiwan and the literature on institutional 
investors.  
Future research can take advantage of the methodology presented here to study differentials 
of information across groups of investors and their effects on liquidity. On the other hand, we 
consider that additional research be done concerning the differences between the local and 
foreigner information in emerging markets. Seasholes (2004), Chan and Hameed (2005) and this 
paper provide results consistent with the common intuition that foreigners have an edge in terms 
of macro information, but more direct evidence needs to be provided.  
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PINL: Probability of informed local trading.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. 
Parameters estimated by maximum likelihood, with the informed trading model described in 
section 2, using data from Jakarta Stock Exchange from April 2004 to March 2006. Model 
estimated each stock-month from daily data, stock-months with less than 6 trading days are not 
used in the model. Size deciles by average market capitalization in 2005. 
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Figure 2.  PINF vs PINL 
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αL : Probability of a local informed day.  αF: Probability of a foreign informed day.  µL: Probability of local informed trade in 
an interval, conditional on a local informed day.  µF: Probability of foreign informed trade in an interval, conditional on a 
foreign informed day. µL,  µF expressed based on a day with 3,600 intervals. Parameters estimated by maximum likelihood, 
with the informed trading model described in section 2, using data from Jakarta Stock Exchange  from April 2004 to March 
2006. Model estimated each stock-month from daily data, stock-months with less than 6 trading days are not used in the 
model.  Stock-months with either µL,  µF   larger than 0.5 are not presented (less than 2% of the total data).   
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Figure 4.  Conditional PINF vs Conditional PINL 
 
Conditional PINL (PINF):  Probability of informed trading given that the trader is local (foreigner).  
Computed  from parameters of  the informed trading model described in section 2, estimated by maximum 
likelihood, using data from Jakarta Stock Exchange  from April 2006 to March 2005. Model estimated each 
stock-month from daily data, stock-months with less than 6 trading days are not used in the model.   
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PINL: Probability of informed local trading.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. Conditional PINL 
(PINF):  Probability of informed trading given that the trader is local (foreigner) computed from the estimated 
parameters. Parameters estimated by maximum likelihood, with the informed trading model described in 
section 2, using data from Jakarta Stock Exchange  from April 2004 to March 2006. Model estimated each 
stock-month from daily data, stock-months with less than 6 trading days are not used in the model.  
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Table 1. Example of estimation of the informed trading model  
Results of estimating the parameters of the informed trading model using simulated data. The model described in 
section 2 is simulated using the parameters in the 'True values' row, with 480 intervals per day.  A sample of 65 
simulated days is used to estimate back the parameters, indicated in the two rows 'Quarter’ .Likewise, a sample of 
22 simulated days is used to estimate back the parameters, by maximum likelihood, as indicated in the Row 
'Month'..  
             
Interval: The sum of the total number of trades and no-trades in a day. αL : Probability of a local informed day.  αF: 
Probability of a foreign informed day. δL: Probability of a low information given that is a local informed day  δF: 
Probability of a low information given that is a foreign informed day.  µL: Probability of local informed trade in an 
interval, conditional on a local informed day.  µF: Probability of foreign informed trade in an interval, conditional on 
a foreign informed day.  ε:  Probability of arrival of an uninformed trader. φ: probability of a foreign uninformed, 
placing either a market or a limit order. PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. ρ: parameter of correlation of 
the two signals. PINL: Probability of informed local  trading. PINL - PINF : difference between the two probabilities 
of informed trading.  Standard errors in parenthesis, estimated by the inverse of the Hessian Matrix. 
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True 
values  
480 0.25 0.15 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.27 0.17 
              
Simulated 
period 
             
              
Quarter  480 0.23 0.14 0.77 0.39 0.31 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.16 
65 days  (0.034) (0.028) (0.076) (0.115) (0.004) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.015) (0.028) (0.027) 
              
Quarter 960 0.23 0.14 0.77 0.39 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.08 0.22 0.14 
65 days  (0.034) (0.028) (0.076) (0.115) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.018) (0.014) (0.025) (0.023) 
              
Month 480 0.41 0.27 0.89 0.50 0.31 0.21 0.19 0.29 0.12 0.15 0.37 0.22 
22 days  (0.069) (0.062) (0.069) (0.135) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.029) (0.027) (0.041) (0.05) 
              
Month 960 0.41 0.27 0.89 0.50 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.14 0.33 0.19 
22 days  (0.069) (0.062) (0.069) (0.135) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.029) (0.025) (0.036) (0.043) 
46 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
          
Size 
decile  
Traded 
value 
(Billion  
Rupiah)  
Number 
of 
Trades 
%Foreign 
Investor Trade 
Proportional 
bid-ask 
spread 
Market 
Capitalization 
(Million  
Rupiah) 
% Foreign Investor 
ownership 
   Mean p95   Mean  p5 p95 
1 89.9 23.0 1.9% 10.4% 12.1% 14,913 17.6% 0.1% 50.6% 
2 115.0 22.2 1.4% 7.4% 9.9% 29,394 10.4% 0.0% 48.6% 
3 65.2 14.3 2.8% 20.0% 9.3% 60,977 16.5% 0.4% 55.9% 
4 162.4 21.3 3.4% 30.2% 8.3% 117,493 13.5% 0.0% 42.1% 
5 247.6 25.7 5.8% 50.0% 5.1% 151,112 15.3% 0.0% 38.8% 
6 573.9 42.2 3.8% 30.3% 5.2% 290,692 21.2% 0.7% 63.0% 
7 669.0 39.2 9.4% 50.0% 4.5% 523,349 13.5% 0.9% 39.9% 
8 1965.1 52.0 11.6% 50.0% 3.4% 1,008,397 16.4% 0.3% 46.1% 
9 4751.7 102.0 15.5% 55.2% 3.1% 2,391,294 18.3% 2.0% 50.9% 
10 23261.8 216.7 34.3% 77.1% 1.5% 19,900,000 20.3% 1.6% 57.3% 
          
Total 4496.1 68.8 11.2% 53.9% 5.4% 2,687,820 16.3% 0.0% 50.9% 
          
 
         
The deciles of market capitalization are given by the average market capitalization during 2005. Traded value 
and number of trades are averages of the daily values for the entire period, including non-trading days. % 
Foreign investor Trade is an average of the daily values of (Foreign sales + Foreign buys)/2/ volume. 
Proportional bid-ask spread is the average whenever quotes are available. Market capitalization and % of 
Foreign Investor ownership are averages for the first quarter of 2006. % Foreign Investor Ownership is the 
proportion of listed shares owned by investors. Exclude stock-months with less than 5 trading days. Total 
sample: 359 firms. Period: April 2004 to March 2006. Source: Jakarta Stock Exchange. 
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Table 3.  Summary of results of estimating the Informed trading model 
 
 From JSE daily databases  
 Panel A Panel B 
 Based on  stock-quarters Based on stock-months 
Parameter  
Number of 
estimations Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Mean 
standard 
error
Number of 
estimations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation
Mean 
standard 
error
αL 2144 0.213 0.147 0.149 5228 0.267 0.172 0.186
αF 2144 0.131 0.172 0.164 5228 0.146 0.199 0.212
δL 2144 0.555 0.363 0.320 5228 0.569 0.384 0.362
δF 2144 0.476 0.372 0.306 5228 0.456 0.392 0.355
µL 2144 0.038 0.078 0.006 5228 0.034 0.064 0.007
µF 2144 0.024 0.088 0.014 5228 0.018 0.068 0.054
ε 2144 0.018 0.015 0.068 5228 0.025 0.018 0.080
φ 2144 0.081 0.144 0.126 5228 0.092 0.159 0.144
ρ 2144 0.016 0.034 0.039 5228 0.015 0.045 0.039
PINL 2144 0.212 0.094 0.037 5228 0.218 0.096 0.042
PINF 2144 0.057 0.067 0.021 5228 0.057 0.074 0.021
Conditional PINL 2144 0.242 0.106 5228 0.251 0.108
Conditional PINF 1680 0.553 0.345 3814 0.473 0.365
  
 Panel C: Based on stock months, from JSE transaction databases 
Parameter    
Number of 
estimations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Mean 
standard 
error   
αL   912 0.258 0.174 0.184   
αF   912 0.124 0.198 0.224   
δL   912 0.567 0.387 0.368   
δF   912 0.489 0.394 0.382   
µL   912 0.032 0.056 0.006   
µF   912 0.008 0.021 0.001   
ε   912 0.026 0.017 0.075   
φ   912 0.065 0.112 0.143   
ρ   912 0.015 0.040 0.037   
PINL   912 0.215 0.102 0.044   
PINF   912 0.041 0.066 0.019   
Conditional PINL   912 0.237 0.110    
Conditional PINF   613 0.423 0.369    
         
Parameters resulting of the estimation of the informed trading model described in section 2, estimated by maximum likelihood, using daily data from Jakarta Stock 
Exchange from April 2004 to March 2006 (Panels A and B) and transaction data from April 2005 to July 2005 (Panel C). αL: Probability of a local informed day. 
αF: Probability of a foreign informed day. δL: Probability of a low information given that is a local informed day  δF: Probability of a low information given that is a 
foreign informed day.  µL: Probability of local informed trade in an interval, conditional on a local informed day.  µF: Probability of foreign informed trade in an 
interval, conditional on a foreign informed day.  ε:  Probability of arrival of an uninformed trader. φ: probability of a foreign uninformed, placing either a market or 
a limit order. ρ: parameter of correlation of the two signals.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading.  PINL: Probability of informed local trading. Conditional 
PINL (PINF):  Probability of informed trading given that the trader is local (foreigner) computed from the estimated parameters. The parameters µL, µF  and  ε are 
expressed based on a day with 3600 intervals.  Number of estimations: the number of  stock-quarters (stock-month) where the parameter could be estimated, 'Mean' 
and 'Standard deviation' are the average and standard deviation of the parameter across the estimations, respectively. 'Mean standard error' is the average standard 
error for the parameter, estimated using the Hessian Matrix. 
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Table 4  Comparing probability of informed trading for locals and foreigners 
       
 A  B  C  
Size 
decile PINL  PINF  PINL >PINF  PINL <PINF  
PINL 
conditional  
PINF  
conditional   
1 0.26  0.03 ** 56%  0%  0.27  0.59 ** 
2 0.28  0.02 ** 66%  1%  0.28  0.50 ** 
3 0.26  0.03 ** 57%  1%  0.27  0.49 ** 
4 0.25  0.03 ** 55%  3%  0.26  0.47 ** 
5 0.23  0.04 ** 54%  0%  0.25  0.49 ** 
6 0.24  0.03 ** 56%  2%  0.25  0.47 ** 
7 0.23  0.06 ** 48%  2%  0.25  0.52 ** 
8 0.22  0.07 ** 42%  1%  0.26  0.51 ** 
9 0.21  0.09 ** 39%  1%  0.26  0.48 ** 
10 0.17  0.11 ** 18%  0%  0.27  0.38 ** 
Total 0.23  0.06 ** 46%  1%  0.26  0.47 ** 
             
 D  E 
Size 
decile 
Market Share uninformed  
Locals               Foreigners       αL  αF  µL  µF  
1 70.5%  0.8% ** 0.25  0.04 ** 0.041  0.020 * 
2 70.0%  0.8% ** 0.26  0.04 ** 0.043  0.018 ** 
3 70.4%  1.4% ** 0.23  0.05 ** 0.023  0.011 ** 
4 71.4%  1.2% ** 0.24  0.05 ** 0.020  0.014  
5 69.9%  2.5% ** 0.26  0.08 ** 0.019  0.009 ** 
6 70.6%  2.4% ** 0.26  0.09 ** 0.035  0.014 ** 
7 67.4%  3.9% ** 0.28  0.14 ** 0.022  0.010 ** 
8 64.1%  6.3% ** 0.28  0.17 ** 0.033  0.015 ** 
9 61.1%  9.1% ** 0.30  0.22 ** 0.054  0.029 ** 
10 49.6%  21.7% ** 0.34 * 0.36  0.073  0.042 ** 
Total 64.7%  6.7% ** 0.28  0.15 ** 0.045  0.024 ** 
             
 F  G  H  
Size 
decile PINL  PINF  PINL >PINF  PINL <PINF  
PINL 
conditional  
PINF  
conditional  
1 0.279  0.008 ** 71%  0%  0.282  0.400  
2 0.295  0.009 ** 79%  0%  0.298  0.433  
3 0.250  0.018 ** 65%  0%  0.257  0.480 * 
4 0.263  0.019 ** 65%  0%  0.270  0.355  
5 0.217  0.031 ** 56%  1%  0.226  0.375 * 
6 0.243  0.023 ** 64%  0%  0.255  0.385 * 
7 0.226  0.040 ** 60%  0%  0.242  0.427 ** 
8 0.223  0.053 ** 51%  1%  0.246  0.485 ** 
9 0.220  0.059 ** 51%  1%  0.253  0.445 ** 
10 0.174  0.093 ** 28%  0%  0.232  0.413 ** 
Total 0.230  0.043 ** 55%  2%  0.252  0.429 ** 
 
Averages of the parameters estimated with the informed trading model detailed in section 2 for each decile of market capitalization and for the 
Total sample. Parameters of the informed trading model described in section 2, estimated by maximum likelihood,  using daily data from 
Jakarta Stock Exchange from April 2004 to March 2006 (Panels A to E) and transaction data from April 2005 to July 2005 (Panels F to H). 
The Model is estimated for each stock-month from daily data, stock-months with less than 6 trading days are not used in the model. PINL: 
Probability of informed local trading.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. PINL >PINF and PINL <PINF :  stock-months for which 
this different is significant at the 5% level. αL: Probability of a local informed day.  αF: Probability of a foreign informed day.  µL: Probability 
of local informed trade in an interval, conditional on a local informed day.  µF: Probability of foreign informed trade in an interval. µL, µF  
expressed based on a day with 3600 intervals (maximum number of trades) and conditional on  αF >0 and  αL >0. Conditional PINL (PINF):  
Probability of informed trading given that the trader is local (foreigner). Local (Foreign) Uninformed: % of the traders that correspond to the 
local (foreign) uninformed group either by posting market orders or providing liquidity with limit orders.   **,  *:  lower than  the average for 
the local (foreigner) group at  1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Time series regressions of liquidity against  PINF and PINL 
           
        
 A  B  C  D  E  F  G  
               
LAG_SPREAD 0.469 ** 0.462 ** 0.505 ** 0.456 ** 0.298 ** 0.415 ** 0.541 ** 
VALUE  
-0.110 ** -0.112 ** -0.108 ** -0.123 ** -0.121 ** -0.106 ** -0.109 ** 
RETURN 
-3.345 ** -3.274 ** -4.525 ** -3.942 ** -3.294 ** -3.285 ** -5.874 ** 
VOLAT  4.769 ** 4.759 ** 4.422 ** 3.932 ** 4.888 ** 3.909 ** 5.484 ** 
PINF   0.186 ** 0.271 ** 0.329 ** 0.228 * 0.447 * 0.195 ** 
PINL   0.065 * 0.138 ** 0.207 ** 0.126 ** 0.16 * 0.106 * 
               
N 4334  4334  2726  1339  1387  858  1868  
R2 0.91328  0.91376  0.93156  0.9294  0.95582  0.89446  0.90152  
               
PINF =PINL 
effect 
p-value   
0.014  0.067  
        
               
 
Results of regressing of liquidity (log of average proportional bid-ask spread) against PINF, PINL and firm characteristics for 
stock-months. Data from the Jakarta stock Exchange, from April 2004 to March 2006. Excludes stock-months with less than 6 
trading days, or less than 21 transactions.  All models include firm-specific effects and a constant (omitted). Panel A and B 
include the whole sample, while Panels C to G are restricted to those stock-months with standard errors below 0.10 for PINL, and 
0.05 for PINF . Panel D are stock-months before April 2005, whereas Panel E is after March 2005. Panel F is for stocks in deciles 
1 to 5, while Panel G is for deciles 6 to 10.LAG SPREAD is the log of average proportional bid-ask spread for the previous 
month. VALUE is the log of the average value traded by stock month in million Rupiah. RETURN is the return in the stock 
month. VOLAT is the average of the absolute value of the daily return in the stock month. PINL: Probability of informed local 
trading.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. PINF, PINL estimated with the informed trading model detailed in section 
2, by maximum likelihood. PINF effect ≠PINL effect is the p-value of a Wald-test on the difference of the coefficients of PINF 
and PINL.. Heteroskedastic Robust standard errors:  *: Significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 6 . Cross-sectional Tobit regression of  PINF and PINL on firm variables 
 
 
 
 
 A  B  C  D  E  F  
Variable PINL  PINF  PINL  PINF  PINL  PINF  PINL  PINF  PINL  PINF  PINL  PINF  
                         
SIZE -0.029 ** 0.045 ** -0.030 ** 0.046 ** -0.028 ** 0.045 ** -0.030 ** 0.046 ** -0.041 ** 0.039 ** -0.018 ** 0.051 ** 
VOLAT 0.636 ** -0.890 ** 0.640 ** -0.887 ** 0.689 ** -0.901 ** 0.576 ** -0.743 ** 0.422 * -0.734 ** 0.852 ** -0.879 ** 
VALUE  0.005 ** 0.001  0.006 ** -0.001  0.009 ** 0.006 * 0.012 ** 0.008 ** 0.019 ** 0.013 ** 0.005  0.004  
FOREIGN 
OWN.     -0.044 ** 0.109 ** -0.038 ** 0.114 ** -0.044 ** 0.114 ** -0.052 * 0.139 ** -0.034  0.116 ** 
EXPORT          0.025 ** -0.064 ** 0.008  -0.036 * -0.005  -0.051 * 0.020  -0.025  
ADR          -0.020  -0.001  -0.016  0.031  -0.018  0.032  -0.012  0.021  
R2          -0.113 ** -0.192 ** -0.120 ** -0.243 ** -0.158 ** -0.281 ** -0.082  -0.212 ** 
LAG PINF               -0.113 **   -0.079 **   -0.138 **   
LAG PINL                 -0.085 **   -0.053 *    -0.114 ** 
                         
N 4870  4870  4870  4870  4866  4866  4152  4152   1976  1976  2176  2176  
Industry 
effects? No   No   No   No   No   No   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
                         
Results of a Tobit model of PINF, PINL by stock month against firm characteristics. Data from the Jakarta stock Exchange, from April 2004 to March 2006, unless noticed otherwise. Excludes stock-
months with less than 6 trading days, or less than 21 transactions. All models include month specific effects and a constant (omitted). Models D to F include industry specific effects.  PINL: Probability of 
informed local  trading.  PINF: Probability of informed foreign trading. PINF, PINL estimated with the informed trading model detailed in section 2, by maximum likelihood. SIZE is the log of the average 
market capitalization of the stock month in million Rupiah. VOLAT is average of the absolute value of the daily return in the period. VALUE is the log of the average value traded in million Rupiah by 
the stock in the period. FOREIGN OWN. Is the average foreign share of ownership. EXPORT: Is the ratio of total export sales on total sales for 2005 (from Bloomberg).  R2 is the r2 on the regression the 
daily returns of the stock against the JSE market index for days with transactions for the entire period. ADR is a dummy variable, =1 if the stock has an ADR (from Bank of NewYork ADR database). 
LAG PINF(LAG PINL) is the last month PINF (PINL).  Standard errors:  *: Significant at the 5% level, ** significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 7  Market-wide effects of PINL and PINF  on liquidity 
               
Variable        A  B  C  D  E  F  G  
               
LAG_SPREAD 0.462 ** 0.455 ** 0.462 ** 0.454 ** 0.399 ** 0.275 ** 0.432 ** 
PINL 0.186 ** 0.146 ** 0.186 ** 0.143 ** 0.161 * 0.129   0.128 ** 
PINF 0.065 * 0.069 * 0.066 * 0.065 * 0.080  0.017   0.052  
VALUE -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 ** 
-
0.114 ** -0.12 ** -0.13 ** -0.113 ** 
RETURN 
-
3.274 ** -2.67 ** -3.23 ** -2.73 ** -2.45 ** -2.68 * -2.628 ** 
VOLAT 4.759 ** 4.519 ** 4.746 ** 4.538 ** 4.287 ** 4.887 ** 4.467 ** 
MKT_PINF   1.542 **   1.610 ** 2.114 ** 0.618 * 0.608 ** 
MKT_PINL     
-
0.123  0.279  1.165 ** -0.03   -0.233  
MKT_SPREAD              16.345 ** 
               
               
N 4334  4334  4334  4334  2170  2164   4334  
adj R2 0.907  0.909  0.907  0.909  0.904  0.925  0.911  
 
 
Results of a time-series model of liquidity for stock-months (log of average proportional bid-ask spread). Data from the Jakarta stock 
Exchange, from April 2004 to March 2006. Excludes stock-months with less than 6 trading days, or less than 21 transactions. All 
models include firm specific effects and a constant (omitted). PINL: Probability of informed local trading. PINF: Probability of 
informed foreign trading. PINF, PINL Parameters estimated by maximum likelihood, with the informed trading model described in 
section 2. VALUE is the log of the average value traded by stock-month in million Rupiah. RETURN is the return in the stock month. 
VOLAT is the average of the absolute value of the daily return in the stock month. MKT_PINF (MKT_PINL): Value weighted average 
across stocks of PINF (PINL) for a given month with standard errors lower than 0.05 (0.10). MKT_SPREAD. Log of the Value 
weighted average across stocks of proportional bid-ask spread.   
 
Robust standard errors: * significant at the 5% level. ** significant at the 1% level 
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Appendix  
 
The probability of a given vector   of  foreign buys, foreign sells, local buys and local sells, Γ = 
[FB, FS, LB, LS, NT]’  is a function of the signals ΨF, ΨL and the parameters of the model 
described in section 2, as follows.  
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = 0}=      CΓ  [μF φ+(1- μF)εφ]FB [μF +(1- μF)εφ]FS  
                                   · [μF (1-φ)+(1- μF)ε(1-φ)]LB [(1- μF)ε(1- φ)] LS  [(1- μF)(1-ε)]NT                [A.1] 
 
 
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = 0}=    CΓ  [μF +(1- μF)εφ]FB [μF φ+(1- μF)εφ]FS [(1- μF)ε(1- φ)] LB   
· [μF (1-φ)+(1- μF)ε(1-φ)]LS [(1- μF)(1-ε)]NT                                              [A.2] 
 
 
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = 0, ΨL = L}=     CΓ  [μL φ +(1- μL)ε φ]FB [(1- μL)ε φ] FS [μL (1-φ)+(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LB 
 
  · [μL +(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LS [(1- μL)(1-ε)]NT                                                    [A.3] 
 
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = 0, ΨL = H}=    CΓ  [(1- μL)ε φ] FB [μL φ +(1- μL)ε φ]FS [μL +(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LB 
 
· [μL (1-φ)+(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LS [(1- μL)(1-ε)]NT                    [A.4] 
 
Pr{ Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = L}=      CΓ   [(μF + μL - μF μL )φ +(1-μF )(1- μL)εφ]FB  
    · [μF( 1- ½ μL) +(1-μF )( 1- μL)εφ] FS  [(μF + μL - μF μL )(1-φ) +(1-μF )( 1- μL)εφ]LB  
· [μL(1- ½ μF) +(1-μF )( 1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LS[(1-μF )( 1- μL) (1-ε)]NT        
[A.5]  
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = H}=       [μF( 1- ½ μL) +(1-μF )( 1- μL)εφ] FB 
· [(μF + μL - μF μL )φ +(1-μF )(1- μL)εφ]FS [μL(1- ½ μF) +(1-μF )(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LB 
· [(μF+μL - μF μL )(1-φ) +(1-μF )( 1- μL)εφ]LS [(1-μF )( 1- μL) (1-ε)]NT        
[A.6]  
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = H, ΨL = L}=      CΓ   [μF( 1- ½ μL)+ μL(1- ½ μF) φ +(1-μF )( 1- μL)εφ] FB 
· [μF( 1- ½ μL) φ +(1-μF )(1- μL)εφ]FS [μL(1- ½ μF)(1-φ)+(1-μF )(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LB 
· [μL(1- ½μF) + μF(1- ½ μL)(1- φ)+(1-μF )(1- μL)ε (1-φ)]LS [(1-μF )( 1- μL) (1-ε)]NT        
[A.7]  
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = L, ΨL = H}=   CΓ   [μF( 1- ½ μL) φ +(1-μF )(1- μL)εφ]FB    
· [μF(1-½ μL)+μL(1- ½ μF) φ +(1-μF )(1- μL)εφ] FS 
·  [μL(1- ½μF) + μF(1- ½ μL)(1- φ)+(1-μF )(1- μL)ε (1-φ)]LB  
    · [μL(1- ½ μF)(1-φ)+(1-μF )(1- μL)ε(1-φ)]LS[(1-μF )( 1- μL) (1-ε)]NT       
 [A.8]  
 
Pr{Γ | ΨF = 0, ΨL = 0}=   CΓ   [εφ]FB+FS [ε(1-φ)]LB+LS [1-ε] NT                                                                    [A.9] 
 
Where  CΓ is the number of ways of arranging combinations FB foreign buys, FS foreign sales, 
LB local buys, LS local sells and NT non-trade intervals 
 
  
